Random Ruminations

Good news from Iraq.

The better-than-expected turnout in Iraq will provide some positive momentum to the new government and is a tactical defeat for the insurgents.  This is all good news.

By the way - they sure put us to shame, didn't they? (as an electorate, that is)  We rarely break 50% in our presidential elections and they get 60% turnout in the face of credible threats of violence.  Hats off to the Iraqis.

This is funny.

Its a humorous reference to a Georgia school district's warning stickers on textbooks covering evolution, in case you missed the original story.

US Troops in Iraq

Bush told the New York Times that we'd leave if asked by the new government, although he adds that he doesn't think it will happen.  I think he's right, given the hedging by the UIA on the topic.  Kudos to him for saying that, though.

One Down, Two to Go

Feith left.  This is a great day.  Much of the responsibility of postwar planning in Iraq went to him, after the Pentagon declared the State departments 'Future of Iraq' project DOA.  He was also Chalabi's main champion in the Pentagon - Feith wanted to fly him to Iraq after the invasion and install him as leader.  It was only last February that Chalabi sat behind Laura Bush at the State of the Union address, 8 weeks later the Marines raided his compound in Iraq and discovered that he was spying for Iran. Feith was also implicated in the Abu Ghraib mess - apparently it was his office that declared the Geneva conventions didn't apply to Iraqi prisoners. Even Tommy Franks called him "the fucking stupidest guy on the face of the earth".

He is an ideologue who failed miserably in his post, and he will not be missed.

Worth a Laugh

Iranian Influence in the UIA

Following up on my previous post, I started doing a bit or research on Iranian ties to the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), which will almost certainly be the dominant power in Iraq after this Sunday's elecitons.

As a reminder, the UIA is a coalition of religious Shiite parties that was organized by orders of Grand Ayatollah Al-Sistani, the esteemed Shiite cleric.  Al-Sistani ordered the parties to form the coalition to prevent splintering the Shia vote.  The two largest parties in the UIA are the SCIRI (Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq) and the Dawa party (also shows up in English as Daawa or Al-Daawa). 

Start with Al-Sistani.  Sistani is himself Iranian by birth.  In fact his name refers to the Sistan region of Iran where his family is from.

The SCIRI Party – this party was formed in Tehran by Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, who actually left the Dawa party to found SCIRI.  His uncle’s cousin was the religious mentor of Iran’s revolutionary leader Grand Ayatollah Khomeini (when he was exiled in Najaf).  The SCIRI name itself refers to an organization Khomeini’s government founded in 1981, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolutions in the World.  The goal of this organization was to promote Iranian-style revolutions in other countries, starting with those with large Shia populations (e.g. Iraq).

The Dawa Party – this is an old Iraqi Shia party that was driven into exile by Sadaam that ended up under Iranian patronage.  Americans have experience with it – it was ultimately behind the arms-for-hostages deal with Iran that turned into the Iran-Contra scandal during the Reagan administration.  This starts back in 1983, when the Iraqi Dawa party arranged two suicide bombings in Kuwait, targeting the American and French embassies.  Kuwait arrested 17 members of Dawa (referred to as the Dawa 17 or Kuwait 17).  Immediately afterward, Americans started being kidnapped in Lebannon (including the CIA station chief William Buckley and the CNN Bureau chief Jeremy Levin) and in each case the ransom demanded was the release of the Dawa 17.  Knowing that Iran was their patron, an arrangement was made whereby the Reagan administration was to funnel arms to Iran in return for their releasing the hostages.  Incidentally, today’s leaders of Dawa in Iraq don’t deny any of this but simply say the ‘Dawa 17’ were not acting on party orders, rather they had been co-opted by Iranian intelligence.

This is by no means an exhaustive list of ties - but I thought I'd post findings as I continue research on the topic. 

I'm Back

I've been away from the blog for a bit.  I was spending a long weekend in Rochester that the weather made even longer.  I'll be back to posting regularly, starting later today.

Blamestorming over Iraq: The Battle Lines are Drawn

While the principal designers of our war strategy in Iraq have not yet moved into full Scapegoating mode, the groundwork is being prepared.  In her confirmation hearings Rice firmly put the responsibility for troop levels on the military (specifically the generals, NOT the civilian leadership of the military).

I think the battle lines have now been completely drawn. In sum:

Whitehouse (NSC):  Blame the generals.  Money quote:
 

“I sat through briefing after briefing that assessed the plan for both the war and for the immediate postwar period and, as a part of that plan, the troop levels that were recommended by General Franks and by his commanders. The president had good military advice from General Franks, good military advice from Chairman Myers, who represents, of course, not just himself but the corporate body of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And they were very clear that they believed that the plan that they were going to execute, including phase four, that is the stabilization phase, was adequately resourced in terms of troop strength.”

Secretary of Defense: Blame the generals for troop decision and the CIA for not predicting the insurgency. Money quotes: 

"The big debate about the number of troops is one of those things that's really out of my control"

and

"I don't think anyone would say that the intelligence left anyone with the impression that you'd be in the degree of insurgency you're in today" 

 

The Generals:  First pretend that you’re not in the nation building game, that’s “wingtips on the ground”, not “boots on the ground” (i.e. blame the State department).  But when they call bullshit on that, blame the CPA (Paul Bremer) for disbanding the Iraqi army. Money quotes:

 

“How to move Iraq forward using this distinctly American model was problematic . One thing was certain, however: Phase IV would require civilian leadership. In addition to boots on the ground, we would need wingtips on the ground-hundreds, perhaps thousands, of civilians from America and the international community..."

and

“[O]ur planning assumption was that we would guide the Iraqi interim government in building a military and a paramilitary security force drawn from the better units of the defeated regular army. These units would serve side-by-side with Coalition forces to restore order and prevent clashes among the religious and ethnic factions . . . .”

The CPA (Bremer):Blame the Whitehouse and/or the Secretary of Defense. Money quote:

"The single most important change ... would have been having more troops in  Iraq at the beginning and throughout." Bremer "raised this issue a number of times with our government" but "should have been even more insistent."

And that completes the circle.   Looks like the buck has nowhere to stop.

 

Update on Iraq - The Five Big Questions

In a previous post, I argued that there were five key questions that will determine how the situation in Iraq will unfold, one of these being the attitude the new government will take toward the continuing presence of US troops in Iraq.

Two news reports on the topic came out today, but with different conclusions.  The New York Times cites administration officials who say that the government's own intelligence estimate predicts that the new Iraqi government will "almost certainly ask the United States to set a specific timetable for withdrawing its troops." 

But today's FT says the parties are "paying lip service" to withdrawal, but don't "appear  to be interested in seriously pushing the issue after being elected."  They quote officials from both Allawi's Iraqi List and the Sistani-backed United Iraqi Alliance hedging the issue somewhat, saying that Iraq's security forces need to be ready to take over first.

Of course both stories could be true, since the intelligence estimate could simply be wrong or just dated.  If the FT report is accurate, though, that would mean that the Shiites view the insurgency as a highly organized attempt by unreconstructed Baathists to regain power, not simply the actions of  "foreign terrorists" as the Bush administration used regularly to claim.

Falluja is Still Depopulated

The UNHCR estimates that only 8,500 out of the original 200,000 residents of Falluja have returned, per this article in the FT.  More than 2 months have now passed since the assault.  That seems like a pretty big deal, doesn't it?